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THE POLITICAL OFFENSE EXEMPTION
IN INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION: A
COMPARISON OF THE UNITED STATES,

GREAT BRITAIN AND THE REPUBLIC OF
IRELAND
CHARLES L. CANTRELL*
INTRODUCTION

The cornerstone in the law of international extradition of
fugitives from justice is a policy of cooperation between na-

tions.' This cooperation must take into account both the differences in the domestic legal systems and the advancements of
technology in areas that directly affect the criminal justice
system. This principle became apparent as scientific developments in mass transportation and communication made it easier for a criminal to seek asylum in a foreign nation. 2 The increasing use of terrorism by politically motivated persons has
combined with the rapid scientific advances in transportation
and communication to present a very real danger to the control
and suppression of international crime. These factors have
pointed to a need for revision and modernization of the extradition laws and treaties of Ireland, Great Britain and the United
States.
The needed revision has been delayed for a variety of reasons. The main factor has been the failure of nations to renegotiate bilateral extradition treaties. Ireland, Great Britain and
the United States have recently recognized their respective
shortcomings with respect to the control of international crime,
especially terrorism, and have entered into some bilateral
* J.D. 1972, Baylor University; LL.M. 1976, University of Texas; Assistant Professor of Law, Marquette University Law School.
1. Ireland, Great Britain and the United States adhere to the principle that extradition will be granted only in the event of a treaty. For references see I. SHEARER,
EXTRADITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAw

at 24 (1971) [hereinafter cited as

SHEARER].

2. Harvard Research in InternationalLaw, Extradition, 29 Am. J. INT'L L. Supp.
35, 37 [hereinafter cited as Harvard Research]. The advances in the technologies of
transportation and communication are set forth in this section, but offer no preview
of the remarkable changes that would occur in the forty-one years subsequent to the
publishing of this treatise.
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treaties and arrangements tightening the controls over such
criminal acts.'
This article will deal with one of the central subjects in the
international extradition problem - the political offender.
Traditional definitions of "political offenses" and "political
offenders" have been found to be inappropriate for dealing with
the terrorism that the international political offenders sometimes produce. The politically oriented terrorist has been one
of the targets of recent treaties and enactments in all three
countries under consideration.
This article's comparison of the domestic laws regarding the
political offense exemption in extradition will proceed in three
general sections. The first section will discuss the political offender's general position in international extradition. The second section will trace the historical development of each nation's case and statutory law up to its present status. Finally,
the last section will discuss the recent developments in Ireland,
Great Britain and the United States in regard to new legislation and renegotiated treaties. Appropriate emphasis will be
placed on the elusive definition of "political offense" in these
jurisdictions.
I.

POLITICAL OFFENSES AND OFFENDERS

There is no universally acceptable definition of what constitutes a "political offense." 4 However, there is a generally accepted rule which states that political offenders are not subject
to international extradition.5 The fundamental difficulty in
arriving at a universally acceptable definition of a political
offense results from the wide variety of tests used by the var3. SHEARER, supra note 1, at 42. Shearer maintains that the practice of a few states
to denounce all their extradition treaties in anticipation of a major revision of their
municipal extradition laws has impeded the progress of international cooperation in
this area. He cites the residual legal effects of wars and state successions as major
factors causing the gap in the international network of extradition treaties. Id. at 4351.
4. M. GARcIA-MORA, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ASYLUM AS A HUMAN RIGHT 73-102
(1956).
5. The acceptance of this principle is regarded as the result of the nineteenth
century political revolutions in Europe. The different political systems which emerged
from the ideological struggles during that period developed the proposition that a
person should enjoy the freedom of political action in his homeland. McCall-Smith &
Magee, The Anglo-Irish Law Enforcement Report in Historicaland PoliticalContext,
1975 CRIM. L. REV. 200 (Eng.) [hereinafter cited as McCall-Smith & Magee]. See also
SHEARER, supra note 1, at 166.
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ious nations' judicial or executive branches in attempting to
measure the offender's motivations and political goals.6 Taking
into account the various approaches in existence, it is now
considered by one authority that a political offense can be
broadly defined as an offense against the security of the state.'
Motivations of the Political Offender
Traditional theory of political offender motivation assumes
that penal sanctions will not deter his actions.8 The political
offender allegedly is committed to the principle of political
change through his act, and does not consider his actions
blameworthy. He attacks the status quo through his act, and
denies the legitimacy of the particular laws, claiming instead
an allegiance to a "superior legitimating principle." ' For him
this "higher principle" or political cause justifies the violation
of penal law.'" Whether the political offender's values are considered appropriate so as to preclude extradition is a test of
pure subjective intent. In determining his intent, courts have
traditionally admitted all evidence of the offender's political
history and police records."
6. HarvardResearch, supra note 2, at 113. The commentary to the draft convention
on extradition related that prior treaties and statutes offered no assistance in defining
political offenses. The tests used excluded crimes from the realm of nonextraditable
political offenses and are summarized on pages 114-15.
7. Garcia-Mora, The Nature of Political Offenses: A Knotty Problem of Extradition Law, 48 VA. L. REV. 1226 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Garcia-Mora].
8. M. BASSIOUNI, CRIMINAL LAW AND rrs PROCESSES: THE LAW OF PUBLIC ORDER 1138 (1969).
9. Bassiouni, Ideologically Motivated Offenses and the Political Offenses Exception in Extradition - A Proposed Juridical Standard for an Unruly Problem, 19
DEPAUL L. REV. 217, 228 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Bassiouni].
10. Id. at 229. This rule is only valid in its most elementary sense if it does not
employ some type of proportionality doctrine. This doctrine deals not with the relevance or connection of the act to the political goal, but rather with the nature and extent
of the crime committed in relation to the actor's political goal. For example, murder
has uniformly been held to constitute a political crime, but a mass murder would
certainly shed a different light on the same occurrence. The mass murder could be
committed against governmental officials during a civil war, and otherwise be classified as a political offense in the strict sense of the term. However, if the extent of the
mass murder so shocked the conscience as to render it "brutal" by its method of
commission or by its intended range of applicability, it should arguably be considered
nonpolitical through the proportionality test. For further discussion regarding the use

of this doctrine, see S.

BEDI, EXTRADITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE
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(1968) [hereinafter cited as BEDI]. Reasons for the doctrine's non-use and ultimate
rejection are found in Harvard Research, supra note 2, at 117-18.
11. The recent Irish case of State (Magee) v. O'Rourke [1971] Ir. R. 205 is an
example of the length to which a court will go in order to consider relevant evidence
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Classes of Political Offenses
The requirement of proof regarding the offender's subjective
intent varies greatly with the type of political offense. The
closer he strikes at the government the greater the proportionate increase in the weight of the presumption that his act was
politically motivated.
The "pure" political offense is customarily directed against
the government. It has been described by one authority as constituting "[A] subjective threat to a political ideology or its
supporting structures without any of the elements of a common
crime. It is labeled a 'crime' because the interest sought to be
protected is the sovereign."'" These "pure" political crimes
have usually been limited to treason, sedition and espionage., 3
Authorities and courts have consistently held that such "pure"
offenses are political crimes, and will not subject the offender
to extradition. 4
The "relative" political offense is characterized by the presence of one or more common crimes which are related to a
political goal of the offender.' This type of political crime has
traditionally caused the most problems for the courts in their
attempt to define the act as a political one. The degree of
closeness between the common crime and political objective is
subject to the interpretation of the domestic courts of each
nation. As a result, there is no accepted rule applicable in all
nations, but rather a hodgepodge collection of principles often
dictated by political events and changing circumstances.'"
of intent. The defendant successfully opposed his extradition by convincing the Irish
Supreme Court that he would be prosecuted for a political offense if he was extradited
to Northern Ireland. His warrant listed four nonpolitical and scheduled offenses, but
he miraculously convinced the Court through his oral testimony that Northern Ireland
authorities were prepared to violate their treaty obligations and initiate a political
prosecution. See also Blaghd, The ExtraditionPosition, Part VIII, 107 Ir. L.T.R. 30102 (1973).
12. Bassiouni, supra note 9, at 245. "[Tjhere are to be identified purely political
offenses, which are directed against the form and political organization of the
State ..
" Re Campora, 25 I.L.R. 518 (Supreme Court, Chile 1957).
13. Harvard Research, supra note 2, at 113; Garcia-Mora, Treason, Sedition and
Espionage as Political Offenses Under the Law of Extradition, 26 U. PITT. L. REV. 65
(1964); and Deere, Political Offenses in the Law and Practiceof Extradition, 27 AM.
J. INT'L L. 247 (1933).
14. See Garcia-Mora, supra note 7, at 123-39 for a complete list of references to
various jurisdictions and authorities.
15. Bassiouni, supra note 9, at 248 and Garcia-Mora, supra note 7, at 1239.
16. I. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAw 707 (8th ed. H. Lauterpacht, ed., 1958)
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There are three factors which are considered by all courts
when determining whether an offense is political. The first factor is the offender's past participation and involvement with
the political movement, and his personal belief as to whether
the crime was justified by his purported political objective. The
second factor is the existence of a connection or link between
the crime and the political objective. Finally, an examination
is made of the relation or proportion between the crime and its
method of commission and the political objective.1 7 It is also

uniformly held that to constitute a political offense the political element must dominate the intent of the offender to commit the crime, and outweigh the apparent significance of the
common crime. I"
The final category of classification of political offenses are
those which are generally termed "international" crimes. Included in this category are such crimes as slavery, 9 war
crimes,"0 genocide, 2' piracy on the sea and in the air,22 and
offenses against the peace and security of mankind. 3 These
types of crimes are forbidden by international law because they
are considered to be inimical to the very concept of a civilized
world order. Offenders committing war crimes and genocidal
acts are excluded by many treaties from consideration as politi[hereinafter cited as OPPENHEIM]. See also the discussion on the development of
British case law, infra at 784.
17. Bassiouni, supra note 9, at 250. See also note 10 supra for a discussion of the
doctrine of proportionality as required in the third element.
18. Bassiouni, supra note 9, at 250.
19. Fischer, The Suppression of Slavery in International Law, 3 INT'L L.Q. 28
(1950); and Gutteridge, Supplementary Slavery Convention, 1956, 6 INT'L & COMP.
L.Q. 449 (1957).
20. Garcia-Mora, War Crimes and the Principle of Non-Extradition of Political
Offenders, 9 WAYNE L. REV. 269 (1963); Green, Political Offenses, War Crimes and
Extradition, 11 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 329 (1962); Neumann, Neutral States and the
Extraditionof War Criminals, 45 AM. J. INT'L L. 495 (1951).
21. Bassiouni, The War Power and the Law of War: Theory and Realism, 18
DEPAUL L. REV. 188 (1968); Lemkin, Genocide as a Crime under InternationalLaw,
41 AM. J. INT'L L. 145 (1947).
22. Harvard Research, supra note 2, at 563; OPPENHEIM, supra note 16, at 609;
VanPanhuys, Aircraft Hijacking and InternationalLaw, 9 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1
(1970); Horlock, The Developing Law of Air Hijacking, 12 HARV. INT'L L.J. 33 (1971);
Mankiewicz, The 1970 Hague Convention, 37 J. Am L. & CoM. 195 (1971).
23. Johnson, The Draft Code of Offenses Against the Peace and Security of
Mankind, 4 INT'L L. & CoMp. L.Q. 445 (1955); Garcia-Mora, CrimesAgainst Humanity
and the Principleof Nonextraditionof PoliticalOffenders, 62 MICH. L. REV. 927 (1964).
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cal offenders. Indeed, most military codes refer to violations of
the Laws of War as military crimes.24
JustificationsFor Not ExtraditingPolitical Offenders
The concept of prohibiting the extradition of political offenders is a recent development in international law. Prior to
the nineteenth century, extradition treaties were signed for the
specific purpose of surrendering political offenders to their
homeland.25 No exemption for political offenders existed during
this period because the medieval states were preoccupied with
insulating themselves from political enemies. The prohibitive
costs and problems involved in the return of fugitives seldom
made it worthwhile for the requesting state to pursue extradi-

tion procedures .

2

1

The reversal of attitudes following the French Revolution
and the increased awareness of the international world order
were the two main factors responsible for the introduction of
the political offense exemption. The traditional justification for
the exemption has been the presumption that the delivery of
political enemies to a requesting state would result in their trial
being influenced by political considerations.2 7 This historical
presumption was bolstered by an unwillingness to become entangled in the requesting state's internal affairs, and an increased acceptance of the democratic view that a person should
be entitled to resort to political activity in his quest for governmental change.3
The political differences between democratic, communistic
and third-world nations have further widened the differences
which were accountable for the initial disintegration of the
shared interests of sovereigns following the French Revolution.
24.
25.
L. 247,
26.
27.

Bassiouni, supra note 9, at 243.
Deere, Political Offenses in the Law and Practiceof Extradition,27 AM. J. INT'L
249 (1933).
Harvard Research, supra note 2, at 108.
See 2 C. HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW CHIEFLY AS INTERPRETED AND APPLIED BY THE
UNITED STATES 1019 (2d ed. 1947), wherein Professor Hyde states that: "It seemed
inequitable that the fate of a revolutionist, who had sought refuge in a foreign land,
should hang upon the success or failure of the uprising in which he had been a participant."
28. An additional justification is that the political offender is no longer a threat to
the internal structure of the requesting state. This should be considered suspect at best
in an age of underground terrorism and highly developed transportation. McCallSmith & Magee, supra note 5, at 201; O'Higgins, Extradition- Offense of a Political
Character- Terrorism, 32 CAMB. L.J. 181, 182 (1973).
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This lack of identity has led to the situation where a nation on
one side welcomes the political refugees from the other side,
and thereby becomes known as a haven for the oppressed. It is
sometimes doubtful whether the courts are actually guided by
a humanitarian concern for the offender,29 but there can be no
doubt as to the importance of the political ramifications of
granting asylum to refugees from another country."
The Duty to Extradite and InternationalCooperation
Historically, there has existed a divergence of opinion as to
whether a state was under a duty to extradite fugitives to another state. Grotius held the view that a state was under a duty
either to punish an international fugitive or extradite him to
the requesting state. 3' He was supported in this view by an
32
impressive array of authorities.
The opposing view was that the state was under only an
imperfect obligation to surrender the fugitive.3 This latter view
has now been adopted as customary state practice. 34 While the
right of a state to grant asylum and refuse extradition is established, a state may also voluntarily relinquish this general right
for a specific treaty obligation that requires extradition. 35 This
practice of entering into extradition treaties, and thereby incurring the obligation to extradite fugitives, has usually been
approached through the bilateral treaty method. Other meth29. It is wise to remember that the self-perceived national interests of the states
will be the predominant factor in any conceptual framework in international law. The
concern for world order will also take precedence over the individual's rights in the
extradition proceedings. Bassiouni, supra note 9, at 223; O'Higgins, Unlawful Seizure
and IrregularExtradition, 36 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 279 (1960); McDougal, Lasswell,
& Reisman, The World Constitutive Process of Authoritative Decisions, 19 J. LEGAL
ED. 253 (1967).
30. The recent example of-the reluctance of the President of the United States to
receive the Soviet refugee Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn is an indication of the political
influences present in political refugee matters.
31. HarvardResearch, supra note 2, at 41.
32. H. WHEATON, ELEmiENTs OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 188 (5th ed. 1916) [hereinafter
cited as WHEATON] lists Burlemaqui, Heineccius, Kent, Rutherford and Schmelzing
as sharing this position.
33. Id., listing such authorities as Heffter, Kluber, Leyser, Luit, Martens, Mittermaier, Saalfeld, Schmaltz and Voet.
34. Harvard Research, supra note 2, at 41.
35. BEDI, supra note 10, at 31; WHEATON, supra note 32, at 193.
36. M. BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION AND WORLD PUBUC ORDER 13-18
(1974). Professor Bassiouni maintains that the bilateral system is especially important
to those nations whose internal laws or policies prohibit extradition. However, the
overall international scheme of the extradition treaty network is riddled with loop-
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ods of extradition, such as a state enacting municipal laws,37
entering into reciprocal arrangements, 38 or demanding extradition through principles of morality, 39 have gained acceptance in
the international community. However, it appears that these
separate processes are being incorporated into the bilateral
framework, at least to the extent that such elements are not
present initially.
Multilateral treaties and conventions have been entered
into by some nations in an effort to replace bilateral treaties
or to compel reciprocal legislative action in the party-states."
These multilateral treaties are customarily entered into by
groups of nations sharing either a mutual geographical or political interest. The advantages of multilateral treaties are a lack
of divergence in national rendition laws and a strong, cohesive
legal system which can be turned to when the natural attrition
of bilateral agreements begins to take its toll. A further longterm benefit resulting from such treaties is that they contribute
to the creation of a "common law of extradition."'"
II.

STATUTORY LAW AND CASE DEVELOPMENT: GREAT BRITAIN

The Act of 1870
In 1870, two years after a select committee had issued its
report on extradition, the Extradition Act of 187042 was enacted
in Great Britain. This basic act, with only a few amendments,
holes. The factors contributing to this problem are discussed in SHEARER, supra note
1, at 43-51.
37. BEDi,supra note 10, at 40-48 discusses and lists the nations which have adopted
either the enumerative system of listing extraditable offenses or the eliminative
method of defining extraditable offenses by reference to terms of punishment.
38. SHEARER, supra note 1, at 31-33, wherein the author discusses both the necessity
of acquiring reciprocal binding assurances in both general statements and ad hoc
declarations. BaDi, supra note 10, at 48-53 should be referred to for a list of statutes
and cases in various nations where the reciprocity principle has been incorporated.
39. BEDi, supra note 10, at 53-60.
40. The European Extradition Convention, Council of Europe, Europ. T. S. No.
24, 359 U.N.T.S. 273, is an example of the replacement type. See generally O'Higgins,
The European Convention on Extradition, 9 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. (1960). An example
of a treaty requiring reciprocal legislation is the scheme of extradition for the Common-

wealth States.

SCHEME RELATINo TO THE RENDITION OF FUGITIvE OFFENDERS WITHIN THE
COMMONWEALTH, CMND. No. 3008 (1966); for an example of the domestic enactment in

Great Britain see Fugitive Offenders Act, 1967, c. 68.
41. SHEARER, supra note 1, at 51-66; see M. BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION
AND WORLD PUBC ORDER 627-28 (1974) for a list of 22 such international conventions
and multilateral treaties.
42. Extradition Act, 1870, 33 & 34 Vict., c. 52.
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remains the law of Great Britain today.
The following section of the Act sets forth the procedure for
dealing with suspected political offenders:
3. Restrictions in surrender of criminals. The following restriction shall be observed with respect to the surrender of
fugitive criminals:
(1) A fugitive criminal shall not be surrendered if the
offence in respect of which his surrender is demanded is
one of a political character or if he prove to the satisfaction of the police magistrate or the court before whom
he is brought on habeas corpus, or to the Secretary of
State, that the requisition for his surrender has in fact
been made with a view to try to punish him for an offence of a political character. 3
The phrase "offence of a political charcter" was not defined in
the Act. The only two interpretations of the phrase were offered
by John Stuart Mill and Mr. Justice Stephen. The former was
of the opinion that a political offense was any offense committed in the course of or furthering a civil war, insurrection or
riot." The latter's view was that a political offense was one
committed during a political disturbance, and was incidental
to and formed a part of such a disturbance. 5
The initial judicial interpretation of this vague phrase occurred in the landmark case of In re Castioni.46 The court declared that a murder of a government official during the heat
of a political riot was an "offence of a political character"
within the intended meaning of the phrase. The decision
adopted Mr. Justice Stephen's definition and created what is
now termed the "political-incidence" test when it stated: "The
question really is, whether.

. .

the man was acting as one of a

number of persons engaged in acts of violence of a political
character with a political object, and part of the political movement and rising in which he was taking part." 7
The Castioni case set up the two-part test which was destined to remain the British rule for sixty-four years: (1) there
must be a political disturbance, and (2) the political offense
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Id. § 3(1).
SHEARER, supra note 1, at 169-70.
II J. STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 71 (1883).

[1891] 1 Q.B. 149.
Id. at 159.
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must be incidental to or form a part of that disturbance. 8
That definition was subject to another interpretation and
apparent mutation three years after Cattioni in the case of In
re Meunier.49 The applicant was identified as a French anarchist who bombed a cafe and army barracks in France before
fleeing to England. The court rejected the contention that the
crime was political because only one explosion destroyed the
government's army barracks. In extraditing the applicant to
France the court expanded the Castioni test by stating:
[I]n order to constitute an offence of a political character,
there must be two or more parties in the State, each seeking
to impose the Government of their own choice on the other,
and . . . if the offence is committed by one side or the other
in pursuance of that object, it is a political offence. ....
.1

The elucidation of the Castioni test resulting from the two
party requirement was unfortunately diluted by the court's
failure to mention the necessity of a political disturbance in the
state. In re Meunier is considered to be the first judicial rejection of anarchism or terrorism as a legitimate international
political method of protest.51
The greatest liberalization in the test for the determination
of political offenses occurred in the case of Ex parte
Kolczynski.52 The English court recognized that a political offense must be examined according to the particular political
circumstances existing at the time. gjustice Cassels noted that
the totalitarian government in Poland considered it treason
merely to seek asylum in the Western World. He felt that the
type of trial the political offenders would receive subsequent to
their return would be meaningless because they would ultimately be punished for their political crime.13 This opinion,

B.

48. Wortley, Political Crime in English Law and in InternationalLaw, 45 BRIT. Y.
INT'L L. 219, 227 (1971); M. BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION AND WORLD

PUBLIC ORDER

388-89 (1974).

49. [1894] 2 Q.B. 415.
50. Id. at 419.
51. Id.: "[Tihe party of anarchy is the enemy of all government. Their efforts are
directed primarily against the general body of citizens."
52. [1955] 1 Q.B. 540. The facts of the case were that the crew of a Polish ship
committed mutiny against their captain for the purpose of gaining asylum in England.
Although the extradition demand consisted of five different scheduled and prima facie
nonpolitical offenses, the crew insisted that they committed the alleged acts solely to

escape from a future political prosecution in their homeland. The case was said to be
in the process of preparation by the ship's political officer when the mutiny occurred.
53. Id. at 549.
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along with Chief Justice Goddard's, extended the categories of
possible political offenses by holding that there was no requirement of a political disturbance or uprising when the country
from which the offender fled had a totalitarian government. 4
The most important aspect of the case was its handling of
the assumption that Poland would violate its treaty obligations
by prosecuting the sailors for a political offense,55 the assumption often ignored in extradition cases. The court stated that a
political offense could emerge either from the evidence in support of the requisition or from the applicant's evidence adduced
in answer. This dictum allowed the court to find for the sailors, and presume an illegal intention from Poland's otherwise
legal requisition.57
The necessary relationship between the offender and a totalitarian state was established in Kolczynski, but there remained some doubt as to whether this liberal rule would apply
to an offender and a non-totalitarian state. All doubts were
answered in a short time with the decision in Schtraks v. Gov5 1 In that case, Lord Radcliffe analogized to
ernment of Israel.
the use of the term "political" in the same sense as when it was
used to modify the words "refugee," "asylum" and "prisoner."
This analysis led him to the conclusion that the requesting
state must want the fugitive for some other purpose than the
enforcement of its penal laws in order to constitute a political
prosecution. He further stated that this was the principle that
the courts were attempting to express in the earlier cases of
Castionil9 and Meunier0 when they required a political uprising or disturbance in the state where the offense was committed. He concluded that the adoption of this liberal view of
54. Id. at 549-50.
55. Id.; see also State v. O'Rourke [1971] Ir. R. 205, supra note 11.
56. Id. at 550.
57. For general commentaries on this case see 31 BRrr. Y.B. INT'LL. 430, 435 (1954);
Amerasinghe, The Schtraks Case, Defining Political Offenses and Extradition, 28
MOD. L. REv. 27, 44 (1965); SHEARER, supra note 1, at 172-73; S. SINHA, ASYLUM AND
INTERNATONAL LAW 176 (1971).
58. [1962] 3 All E.R. 529. The applicant was charged with child stealing and
perjury in Israel for his part in refusing to return a boy to his parents upon demand
some two years after they had left him in his grandfather's care. The applicant's
political "connection" was that he was afraid that the boy would not be educated as
an orthodox Jew, and that the role of orthodox teaching in the schools was a volatile
political issue in Israel at that time.
59. In re Castioni, [1891] 1 Q.B. 149.
60. In re Meunier [1894] 2 Q.B. 415.
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"disturbance" would not drastically depart from the earlier
cases so long as there was some political oppostion between the
fugitive and the state."
The court ultimately found that the offender's act was related to the political and religious struggle taking place in Israel, but was committed for personal motives and not as a part
of any movement and was not committed with the intention of
furthering any movement's goals. Lord Radcliffe felt that without this basic political opposition between the fugitive and the
state, two competing political groups unassociated with the
central government could commit criminal infractions and
claim that they were part of a "political disturbance. 62
The position of the fugitive and the requesting state was
further explored in the 1973 House of Lords decision in TzuTsai Cheng v. Governor of Pentonville Prison.3 In a three to
two decision, the court held that although an offense could be
politically motivated, it would not be considered a political
offense unless the act had been directed at the requesting state.
Since the United States was the requesting state and the Nationalist Chinese government was the national entity at whom
the act was directed it was not a political offense.
Lord Diplock interpreted "political" as requiring the act to
be either (1) an attempt to overthrow the government, (2) an
attempt to induce it to change one of its policies, or (3) an
escape attempt from the country to better accomplish either of
the foregoing objectives.64 In the opinion, Lord Diplock relied
on the concept of territoriality in criminal law. He felt that the
essence of a criminal offense was the establishment of the state
and the offender as the only two participating parties in the
transaction. Carrying the argument to its logical conclusion,
the term "political offense" would connote the existence of a
political conflict between the state and the offender. He was of
the opinion that when the political purpose sought is directed
toward a third state, the logical nexus ceased, and the offense
could not be "political" within the meaning of the phrase.65
61. Schtraks v. Government of Israel, [1962] 3 All E.R. 529, 540.
62. Id.
63. [1973] 2 All E.R. 204. Cheng, a Taiwanese radical, was convicted in the United
States of attempting to murder a leading governmental figure of the Nationalist
Chinese government.
64. Id. at 209.
65. Id.
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In addition to advancing this theory of territoriality, a concurring opinion emphasized that it would be unrealistic to believe that any civilized state would support a rule whose effect
would be an invitation to murderers to take their best shot and
head for the borders. This possible encouragement offered to
political criminals seeking refuge in England was more than
enough to dissuade the British jurist from supporting such a
rule."
It can be observed from the foregoing cases that the English
judges exhibited a propensity to freely interpret the "political
offence" phrase anew in each case arising under the 1870 Act,
thereby resulting in many possible readings of the true state of
the law. However, there are some precepts which can be drawn
from these cases which will help construct a permanent definition of a political offense. They are as follows:
(1) There must exist a close connection between the crime
committed and the political motivation of the actor
(Schtraks).
(2) The political object sought to be achieved is a limited
and specific one, and not one of terroristic qualities
(Meunier).
(3) The crime must take place in the course of a political
struggle (Castioni), unless a political struggle is, as a practical matter, not feasible under a totalitarian government.
Cases involving a totalitarian government will be examined
in the light of a liberal humanitarian policy toward the offender (Kolczynski).
(4) The act, even if arising during a political controversy in
the state, must be committed with the goal of furthering the
movement, and not committed for personal or selfish motivations (Schtraks).
(5) The political crime must be directed at the state requesting extradition (Cheng).
Backing of Warrants (Republic of Ireland) Act 1965
In 1965, the decision of the House of Lords in Regina v.
Metropolitan Police Commissioners, ex parte Hammond7
66. Id. at 223. Lords Simon and Wilbefforce joined in a well-reasoned dissent which
cited many rules of statutory construction and other sources. An excellent example of
how the political offense would change depending upon which side of a bridge the act
occurred taxed the majority's rule to an unsatisfactory conclusion. For a critical review
of the Cheng case see O'Higgins, Extradition - Offence of a Political CharacterTerrorism, 32 CAMS. L.J. 181 (1973).
67. [1965] A.C. 810.
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emphasized the need for a more efficient system concerning the
issuance and execution of arrest warrants from the Republic of
Ireland. The issue in the case was of a technical nature, but it
exposed the fact that the prior system of summarily endorsing
warrants between Ireland and Great Britain had remained unchanged since the establishment of the Irish Free State. 8 The
Irish Court made a concurrent finding the same year that the
practice of the mutual backing of warrants with Great Britain
was unconstitutional because a properly endorsed warrant authorized the removal of a fugitive without allowing him the
opportunity to seek release under the provisions of the Irish
Constitution. 9
These two independent developments quickly led to the
dual promulgation of the Backing of Warrants (Republic of
Ireland) Act 196570 in Great Britain, and the Extradition Act 7'
in the Republic of Ireland. The section of the British Act which
relates to the political offense exemption provides as follows:
2. Proceedings before magistrates' court (2) . . . Nor shall
such an order be made if it is shown...
(a) that the offence specified in the warrant is an offence of a political character...
(b) that there are substantial grounds for believing
that the person. . . will. . . be prosecuted or detained
for another offence, being an offence of a political char-

acter ....

71

The only new addition to the standard political offense definition is the language in section 2(2)(b) which allows the magistrate or court to determine whether the fugitive should be
granted an exemption from extradition if there appears substantial grounds for believing that he will suffer a prosecution
for "another" political offense upon his rendition. This language was interpreted by the House of Lords to include a possible prosecution for an offense not listed in the warrant.73 Lord
68. For a detailed account of this system see O'Higgins, Irish Extradition Law and
Practice,34 BRiT. Y.B. INT'L L. 274 (1958).
69. State (Quinn) v. Ryan [1965] Ir. R. 70.
70. 1965, c. 45.
71. Extradition Act, 1965, No. 17 of 1965. See O'Higgins, The Irish ExtraditionAct,
1965, 15 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 369 (1966).
72. Backing of Warrants (Republic of Ireland) Act, 1965, c. 45.
73. Keane v. Governor of Brixton Prison [1971] 2 W.L.R. 1243, 1248. Keane produced evidence that he had been detained several times in Ireland for political offen-
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Pearson's opinion in the Keane case upheld the decision of the
Queen's Bench Divisional Court in refusing the fugitive's application for a writ of habeas corpus, but rejected the lower court's
narrow interpretation of "another offence" to mean only one in
substitution for the offense in the warrant, and not an additional one in the future. 4
However, the Divisional Court was upheld in rejecting
Keane's contention that a possible political prosecution should
be assumed because the legislature might bar his political activist organization: "It is not enough to show that the applicant
if returned to his own country is likely so to conduct himself in
the future that he will bring upon himself prosecution or detention for future political offences or alleged political offences." 75
This holding can be generally regarded as allowing the fugitive to show that the requesting state has the intent to prosecute him for an offense not listed in the warrant. He may show
the political nature of the additional offense through his evidence, but the offense must be one which he has committed,
and cannot be an act which may perchance be declared an
offense in the future.
There has been only one other significant decision construing the Backing of Warrants Act. In the Littlejohn7 case, the
Queen's Bench Divisional Court found that an armed bank
robbery was not a political offense-even though its ostensible
purpose was to obtain funds for Irish Republican Army activities. The court placed significant reliance upon the dicta of
Lord Diplock in the Tzu-Tsai Cheng v. Governor of Pentonville
Prison77 decision regarding the requisite mental element of the
offender when he commits the crime. Lord Widgery ultimately
held:
ses, and once imprisoned for his political activity. He alleged that he was a member
of a new political organization named "Free Ireland," and that he might be arrested
at any time if the organization was declared illegal under the Offences Against the
State Act, 1939.
74. Lord Parker's approach in the lower court can be found in Regina v. Governor
of Brixton Prison, ex parte Keane [1970] 3 All E.R. 741, 745.
75. Keane v. Governor of Brixton Prison [1971] 2 W.L.R. at 1248. It must be noted
that an affidavit from the Attorney-General of the Republic of Ireland was admitted
into evidence, and that it contained an undertaking that Keane would be prosecuted
only on charges named in the warrant. This would not be regarded as conclusive in
the matter, but was properly admissible before the magistrates' court.
76. Regina v. Governor of Winson Green Prison, Birmingham, ex parte Littlejohn
[1975] 1 W.L.R. 893.
77. [1973] 2 All E.R. 204.
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Thus one reaches the stage now on the weight of authority,
and a considerable weight it is, that an offence may be of a
political character, either because the wrongdoer had some
direct ulterior motive of a political kind when he committed
the offence, or because the requesting state is anxious to obtain possession of the wrongdoer's person in order to punish
him for his politics rather than for the simple criminal offence
referred to in the extradition proceedings. 8

The Divisional Court did give more consideration to Littlejohn's claim that the political character of the bank robbery
was shown by the transference of his trial to the "special criminal court" in Ireland. This decision reflected the liberal and
openminded position of the English Courts as to proving political offenses, but it ultimately held that a trial in the "special
criminal court" of Ireland did not constitute the showing of a
political offense.7"
The Fugitive Offenders Act 1967
In 1967 Great Britain enacted a new Fugitive Offenders
Act,"0 which provided for a uniform method of extradition between the states of the British Commonwealth. The decision to
replace the old Fugitive Offenders Act of 1881,81 came about as
a result of several highly publicized cases which caused political repercussions throughout the Commonwealth. These cases
led to the adoption of a general plan of extradition requiring
reciprocal legislation by all Commonwealth members. 2
The relevant provisions of the Fugitive Offenders Act are as
follows:
78. 1 W.L.R. at 897. The court was able to deal with the question of intent in its
abstract sense because Littlejohn had escaped from Ireland after he was extradited
there by this same court in 1973. Therefore, the court only examined the new evidence
in the case, and did not re-examine their initial determination concerning the evidence
of the bank robbery.
79. Id. at 901. The applicant did produce an expert witness who generally testified
in accordance with this contention, but the Court questioned the competence of the
expert to offer an opinion as to the inference that the special criminal courts specialized
in trying cases of political offenses because juries were too prejudiced to return fair
verdicts. The Court found no evidence to support this position and rejected Littlejohn's
contention.
80. 1965, c. 68.
81. 44 & 45 Vict., c. 69. See Samuels, The English Offenders Act, 1967, 18 U.
TORONTO L.J. 198 (1968); O'Higgins, Reform of Intra-Commonwealth Extradition,
1966 CRIM. L. REv. 361 (Eng.).
82. SCHEME RELATING TO THE RENDITION OF FuGrrIvE OFFENDERS WITHIN THE COMMONWEALTH, CMND. No. 3008 (1966).
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General Restrictions on Return
A person shall not be returned under this Act to a designated Commonwealth country, or committed to or kept in
custody for the purposes of such return, if it appears to the
Secretary of State, to the court of committal or to the High
Court. . . on an application for habeas corpus or for review
of the order of committal(a) that the offence of which that person is accused or was
convicted is an offence of a political character;
(b) that the request for his return (though purporting to be
made on account of a relevant offence) is in fact made for the
purpose of prosecuting or punishing him on account of his
race, religion, nationality or political opinions; or
(c) that he might, if returned, be prejudiced at his trial or
punished, detained or restricted in his personal liberty by
reason of his race, religion, nationality or political opinions.,
4.

Subsection (c) adds the only new element to the political
offense exemption in British practice. This section employes
the vague terminology of "might be prejudiced at his trial"
because of his political opinions. The House of Lords in
84
interpreted this
Fernandez v. Government of Singapore
phrase as adopting a lesser burden of persuasion on the fugitive.
In affirming the Divisional Court's interpretation of section
4(1)(c), Lord Diplock stated:
I do not think that the test of the applicability of paragraph
(c) is that the court must be satisfied that it is more likely
than not that the fugitive will be detained or restricted if he
is returned. A lesser degree of likelihood is, in my view, sufficient; and I would not quarrel with the way in which the test
was stated by the magistrate or with the alternative way in
which it was expressed by the Divisional Court. "A reasonable chance," "substantial grounds for thinking," ".aserious
possibility"-I see no significant difference between these
various ways .... 15
This holding allows an applicant to prove how the political
characteristics of his country would prejudice him at the time
of his return and trial. Rather than adopting the requirement
that the offender must commit a political offense to be exempt
83. Fugitive Offenders Act, 1967, c. 68, § 4(1).
84. [1971] 1 W.L.R. 987.
85. Id. at 994.
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from extradition to Commonwealth members, the court held
that he needs only to show that his political opinions would
tend to prejudice the possibility of receiving a fair trial. 6
Summarizing the British practice under regional agreements, the Backing of Warrants (Republic of Ireland) Act 1965
adds no new elements to the existing definitions of what constitutes a political offense under the 1870 Act governing international extradition. Court decisions have extended the Act's provisions to a logical point where the fugitive is allowed to prove
that he will be politically prosecuted for another political offense in addition to those listed in the formal warrant. The only
restrictive judicial construction has been the requirement that
the commission of the offense occur at a point in time prior to
his habeas corpus hearing. The courts have further recognized
that the conduct of Irish authorities towards an extradited fugitive will be examined, but that the "special criminal courts"
of Ireland are not per se political courts.
The Fugitive Offenders Act of 1967 has been the subject of
only one important judicial decision concerning the political
offense exemption. The court extended the concept significantly by allowing the fugitive a lesser burden of proof in showing that his political opinions might prejudice the possibility
of receiving a fair trial upon rendition.
In the United States, judicial development of the political
offense exemption in international extradition law has not
advanced in the progressive manner exhibited in Great Britain.
There exists no legislative enactment exempting political offenders from extradition to foreign nations. The entire collection of written law concerning political offenders is to be found
in treaties negotiated between the United States and other
87
nations.
The present position of the United States can be traced to
the early case of In re Ezeta,5 8 in which the Salvadorean government attempted to extradite General Ezeta on charges of mur86. This lower burden of proof combined with the showing of radical political
opinions is a significant liberalization of the political offense exemption. Consider, for
example, the varioug loud political radicals who commit crimes, and later seek refuge
and allege that they are unable to receive a fair trial in their homeland.
87. For a complete list of all the bilateral extradition treaties to which the United
States is a party, see Appendix.
88. 62 F. 972 (N.D. Cal. 1894).
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der and robbery. In denying the request for extradition, the
court found the crimes to be political offenses because they
were committed "during the progress of actual hostilities between the contending forces ....89 The court cited the English
case In re Castioni,10 and adopted the principle that an offense
committed during a civil war, insurrection or political commotion was to be considered a political offense.
This holding has been consistently adhered to by the American courts, with the sole exception of dicta in In re Gonzalez.9'
In that case, the court did not find that the fugitive committed
a political offense, but it did recognize that the Castioni rule
was intended to be a flexible one. 2 The court also noted that
the English law had progressed to the point of eliminating the
absolute requirement that the political offense occur in the
course of a political uprising. Ex parte Kolczynski was interpreted as embodying this principle,9 3 and also the closely related rule which states that the political offense exception can
be applied with greater liberality when the requesting state is
a totalitarian regime. 4
One of the most troublesome aspects of the American position regarding political offenses is the liberal application of the
political-incidence test developed under British law.15 It appears that American courts will seize upon the slightest
connection between the crime and political act or objective in
order to find a political offense. This liberal tenet is laudable
from a humanitarian standpoint, but can result in grave abuse
as the case of Artukovic v. Boyle" attests. That case concerned
the Yugoslavian Government's request 8 to extradite a former
89. Id. at 997.
90. [1891] 1 Q.B. 149.
91. In re Gonzalez, 217 F. Supp. 717 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
92. Id. at 721, n. 9, quoting In re Castioni [1891] 1 Q.B. 149, 155: "I do not think
it is necessary or desirable that we should attempt to put into language in the shape
of an exhaustive definition exactly . . . every state of things which might bring a
particular case within the description of an offence of a political character."
93. 217 F.2d at 721 n.9, interpretingEx parte Kolczynski, [1955] 1 Q.B. 540.
94. Id.
95. See note 45 and accompanying text, supra.
96. Neumann, Neutral States and the Extradition of War Criminals, 45 AM. J.
INT'L L. 495, 503 (1951).
97. 140 F. Supp. 245 (S.D. Cal. 1956), aff'd sub nom. Karadzole v. Artukovic, 247
F.2d 198 (9th Cir. 1957), vacated and remanded, 355 U.S. 393 (1958), surrenderdenied
on remand sub nom. United States v. Artukovic, 170 F. Supp. 383 (S.D. Cal. 1959).
The case is noted in 43 MINN. L. REv. 587 (1959).
98. The request was made pursuant to Article VI of the Treaty with Servia. Treaty
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official of the Croation Government who was charged with the
commission of war crimes including the execution of 1,293
named and 200,000 unnamed persons.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit considered
whether the district court was correct in its holding that the
offenses in the complaint and indictment were clearly of a political character. Surprisingly, the appellate court affirmed,
stating that war crimes were not necessarily excluded from the
classification of political offenses. 9 Many references were made
to various authorities and United Nations General Assembly
resolutions for the proposition that war criminals should not be
exempt from extradition, but the court dismissed these by stating that they had insufficient force as law, and suggested that
nations should change the terms of their treaties in order to
accomplish this purpose.' 0 The case was remanded to the district court for a full hearing on the political offense issue, and
the crimes were again found to be political in nature.
The other major problem with the United States position is
that it fails to take into account procedurally the fact that a
"relative" political offense usually arises from facts which can
be viewed in a number of ways. Since habeas corpus review of
the findings of the extradition magistrate is limited to the question of whether the evidence showed a reasonable ground to
believe the accused guilty-the reviewing court is generally
limited to interpreting the law and its application to the
facts.'"'
With Servia on Extradition, Oct. 25, 1901, art. VI, 32 Stat. 1890, T.S. No. 406 (effective
June 12, 1902). The treaty with Servia remains in effect between the United States
and Yugoslavia. Ivancevic v. Artukovic, 211 F.2d 565 (9th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348
U.S. 818, rehearing denied, 348 U.S. 889 (1954).
99. Karadzole v. Artukovic, 247 F.2d at 204.
100. Id.
101. 18 U.S.C. § 3184 (1968) states:
Whenever there is a treaty or convention for extradition between the United
States and any foreign government, any justice or judge of the United States,
or any magistrate authorized so to do by a court of the United States, or any
judge of a court of record of general jurisdiction of any State, may, upon complaint made under oath, charging any person found within his jurisdiction, with
having committed within the jurisdiction of any such foreign government any
of the crimes provided for by such treaty or convention, issue his warrant for
the apprehension of the person so charged, that he may be brought before such
justice, judge, or magistrate, to the end that the evidence of criminality may
be heard and considered.
See Garcia-Guillern v. United States, 450 F.2d 1189 (5th Cir.), cert. denied 405 U.S.
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In summary, the United States judicial development of the
political offense exemption has been non-existent since the
early decision of In re Ezeta.102 Despite the dicta in Gonzalez
acknowledging the progressive English position, the only extradition decision subsequent to that case followed the rather
short list of decisions strictly adhering to the political03
incidence test enunciated in Castioni.
Both the limited scope of review in habeas corpus appeals
and the notion that the slightest connection between the crime
and political objective will suffice, have combined to distort
the original political-incidence test. The present status of the
rule placed undue emphasis on the necessity of a political uprising or disturbance, and far too little emphasis on the political motivation of the individual. It is hoped that when the
American judiciary confronts a case involving a totalitarian
government requesting an offender under facts similar to
Kolczynski, it will possess the foresight to redefine the muddled principle of Artukovic in a progressive manner. 104
III. THE IRISH POSITION
The Irish ExtraditionAct 1965
The Irish Extradition Act 196505 was enacted largely because a total breakdown occurred with Great Britain regarding
the extradition of fugitives."' The Irish Supreme Court held
that section 29 of the Petty Sessions (Ireland) Act 1851 was
unconstitutional to the extent that it authorized the extradition of a fugitive without affording him an opportunity to challenge his arrest and detention. 0 7 The coincidence of the State
989 (1971); M.

BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER

400

(1974).
102. 62 F. 972 (N.D. Cal. 1894).

103. Garcia-Guillern v. United States, 450 F.2d at 1192, held that "A political
offense . . . must involve an 'uprising' or some other violent political disturbance."
The following cases are not discussed in the text, but follow the Ezeta and Castioni
rule of requiring a political uprising and a political objective connected with the criminal act. Jiminez v. Aristequieta, 311 F.2d 547 (5th Cir. 1962), vacated as moot sub nom.
Aristequieta v. First National Bank, 375 U.S. 48 (1963); Ramos v. Diaz, 179 F. Supp.
459 (S.D. Fla. 1959); Ornelas v. Ruiz, 161 U.S. 502 (1896).
104. For criticisms of the American position see SHEARER, supra note 1, at 178-81;
Garcia-Mora, supra note 7, at 1244-49; Green, The Nature of Political Offences, 3 SOL.
Q. 213, 231 (1964).
105. No. 17 of 1965.
106. O'Higgins, The Irish ExtraditionAct, 1965, 15 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 369 (1966).
107. Id. at 372.
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0 8 with Metropolitan Police Commissioner v.
(Quinn) v. Ryan"
9
Hammond, an English decision, exposed a problem that
demanded the attention of both Parliaments.
The Irish Act was heavily influenced by the European Convention on Extradition," ' which Ireland had ratified. The Convention's influence was examined in detail by the Irish Supreme Court in the landmark decision of Bourke v. Attorney
General."'
The issue in the Bourke case was whether a "political offence or an offence connected with a political offence""' 2 had
been committed by Bourke. Bourke had assisted Blake, a Soviet spy, to escape from an English prison where they were both
serving terms. Bourke's counsel contended that the offense of
aiding in the escape became a political offense, because Blake
had been imprisoned for a political offense. In the alternative,
he argued that Bourke's offense was connected with a political
offense. Counsel for Bourke relied on the following provision:
50. (1) A person arrested under this Part shall be released
if...
(2)(2) the offence to which the warrant relates is...
(i) a political offence or an offence connected with a
3
political offence ....

Bourke maintained that he was never a communist, but had
assisted in the escape because he felt compassion for Blake's
"savage" sentence of forty-two years, and because their ideas
of a "just" society were identical."' Bourke further claimed
that he did not wish to aid the Soviet Union, but rather aid
Blake, whom he considered to be a political prisoner.
In the Court's exhaustive analysis of whether Bourke's
offense constituted an "offence connected with a political off108. [1965] Ir. R. 70.
109. [1964] 3 W.L.R. 1.
110. 395 U.N.T.S. 273. For commentaries see Honig, Extradition by Multilateral
Convention, 5 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 549 (1956); Note, European Convention on
Extradition, 9 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 491 (1960).
111. 107 Ir. L.T.R. 33 (1973).
112. Irish Extradition Act, 1965, No. 17 of 1965, § 50(2)(a)(i).
113. Id. This section is included in Part III of the Extradition Act and is applied
specifically between Ireland and the United Kingdom. Part II encompasses those provisions which deal with extradition to and from all countries except the United Kingdom. Part II's counterpart provision is found in section 11 of the Act and is a reproduction of Article 3 of the European convention.
114. Bourke v. Attorney General, 107 Ir. L.T.R. at 42.
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ence," the court placed significant reliance on the travaux
preparatoiresfor the European Convention on Extradition. 5
The final draft proposed for Article Three of the European
Convention defined "connected offences" as those having a
political character of their own. A mere connection would not
suffice. It was also required that the offense be "committed
with a view to preparing for, to ensuring the commission of, to
concealing or to preventing such a political act.""' However,
the parties to the European Convention rejected this language
limiting the connecting offense. Chief Justice O'Daly interpreted this action as follows: "The effect of the omission of the
limitation is to widen the character of the connection which
satisfies the requirements of article 3. The connection need not
'11 7
necessarily be of a political character.
The Chief Justice stated that he would have reached this
decision without reference to the travauxpreparatoiresbecause
the Irish statute did not require that the connecting offense be
political. The logical conclusion is that the Oireachtas allowed
the courts to define the connecting offense in the "widest possible manner."""
The Supreme Court held in a four-to-one decision that
Blake's escape was a political offense, and Bourke's assistance
in that escape was an offense connected with a political offense.
The crucial evidence that made Blake's escape "political" was
his immediate return to Moscow to further serve the Soviet
cause."' Additionally, the Court considered a different offense
in connection with the escape. If the necessary connection with
the political offense of escaping had not been demonstrated,
the Court was prepared to decide whether the escaping was
connected with Blake's original offense of spying. The Court
noted that Bourke could be an accessory after the fact, but
declined to decide the issue.' 0
In State (Magee) v. O'Rourke,'' the applicant was permit115. Id. at 42-46.
116. Id. at 44.
117. Id. at 45-46.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 47. The Court commented that the President of the High Court should
have admitted evidence of a conversation between Blake and the K.G.B. which Bourke
overheard in Moscow. The Court considered Blake's activities after his escape important in determining whether his escape was a political offense.
120. Id.
121. [1971] Ir. R. 205.
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ted to show "substantial reasons" that he would be prosecuted
for a political offense, or an offense connected with a political
offense, if he were returned to Northern Ireland. Magee had
been arrested in Ireland on a warrant listing charges of housebreaking, using a motor vehicle without insurance, malicious
damage to property and assault on a police officer.
Magee testified that on three separate occasions he had
been arrested or detained in Northern Ireland for questioning
in regard to a raid on a certain military barracks. A large
quantity of arms and explosives had been stolen in the raid,
and the police considered it to be the work of the I.R.A. He
testified that the police considered him a prime suspect because of certain secret information the raiders possessed which
only Magee could have known. Magee feared that he would be
prosecuted for participation in the raid because of the discovery of certain photographs which were secretly taken out of the
barracks by a person in Magee's company. After being warned
of possible self-incrimination, Magee declined to answer a
straightforward question regarding his participation in the
raid.
The Court held that Magee had confessed to being involved
in the preparation of the raid even though he refused to admit
any actual participation because of fear of incrimination. The
22
opinions of both Chief Justice O'Dalaigh and Justice Budd
emphasize that the respondent declined the opportunity to
present evidence contrary to Magee's. The majority held that
there was no reason to reject Magee's evidence when absolutely
nothing was shown to the contrary. A well-reasoned dissent by
Justice Fitzgerald, joined by Justice Teevan, argued that the
controlling factor should be whether there was an actual probability of political prosecution and not whether the defendant
could conjure up fears of prosecution. Fitzgerald further stated:
The Act of 1965 was passed in this country as a counterpart to a corresponding statute in Britain in the same year.
The obvious purpose of both Acts was to facilitate the extradition of persons charged with normal criminal offences from
one country to the other, and that it should not be resorted
to by a requesting country in respect of political, military or
fiscal offences. Unless and until statutes are abused by a
requesting country, I consider that it should be assumed that
122. Id. at 211 and 213 respectively.
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it will be properly used. On extradition subsequent to a decision of the High Court or the Supreme Court in this country,
I am not prepared to hold that the requesting country is likely
to be guilty of a breach of faith by prosecuting or detaining
the alleged offender for a political offence. I would allow the
appeal.'2
This dissent correctly identifies the presumption that another
24
nation will not violate her treaty commitments.
Magee accomplished no small feat. He presented a case
against himself, and convinced the Irish Supreme Court
through oral testimony and two affidavits that Northern
Ireland would prosecute him for raiding the military barracks.
It is even more of an accomplishment in light of the fact that
all four offenses in his warrant were prima facie non-political
and ordinary crimes.
This case can be analyzed in one of three ways. First, the
dissent could be correct in their presumption that countries
will not violate treaty commitments. Unless Magee overcame
that presumption the majority opinion would be erroneous.
Second, the majority could be following a principle similar to
Keane, 2 by allowing a great deal of leeway in handling cases
on an individual basis. Finally, the case may be the result of a
dreadfully poor presentation by the respondent. The Court
strongly intimated that it felt compelled to accept the evidence
presented, since the other side refused to produce contrary evidence and failed to discredit the prior evidence. The case could
have had a substantially different result if the respondent had
met his burden of proof.
The O'Rourke decision, coupled with the increasing terrorism of the seventies, prompted the leaders of Ireland and Great
Britain to convene a conference at Sunningdale. The result of
that conference was a joint communique which stated that
their mutual goal was to bring to trial all persons committing
violent crimes in Ireland. The parties were particularly careful
to word this principle to include persons who were acting
through political motivation.
Multilateral Treaties
The astounding increase in the number of aircraft hijack123. Id. at 216.
124. Blaghd, The ExtraditionPosition Part VIII, 107 Ir. L.T.R. 301, 312 (1973).
125. In re Castioni, 1 Q.B. at 159.
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ings and offenses against diplomats has led to three conventions concerning the unlawful seizures of aircraft and one convention relating to the protection of diplomatic personnel. 2 '
Both the United States and Great Britain have been parties to
the three major conventions dealing with aircraft hijacking. On
the other hand, the Republic of Ireland has chosen not to sign
the conventions.
These conventions produced substantial changes in the international practice of granting asylum to political offenders.
A brief review of the three conventions will outline the major
changes, and also pinpoint some problems which have not been
resolved.
The Tokyo Convention
Prior to the adoption of the Tokyo Convention on Aviation:
Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft,127 there had been no uniform set of rules regulating the
disposition of criminals who committed offenses on board aircraft. 28 The Tokyo Convention was the initial undertaking of
the world community to establish a uniform system of dealing
with offenses committed in the air.
However, the Tokyo Convention did not directly address
the issue of punishing the hijacker or requiring his extradition.' 29 Because of the failure to mandate either a compulsory
126. See generally Evans, Aircraft Hijacking: What Is To Be Done? 66 AM. J. INT'L
L. 819 (1972). The author relates that the traditional motivation of seeking political
asylum remains a frequent cause of many aircraft hijackings, despite the fact that
more of the incidents are being used for extortion schemes, and as catalysts in increasing tensions between certain states. A lengthy list of crimes committed against diplomatic personnel during the year 1970-71 appears in Note, 14 VA. J. INT'L L. 703, 704
n.5 (1974).
127. September 14, 1963, 20 U.S.T. 2941, T.I.A.S. No. 6768, 704 U.N.T.S. 219
(effective December 4, 1969) [hereinafter cited as the Tokyo Convention]. For a
complete list of signatory parties see 1976 United States Treaties in Force 332.
128. Fitzgerald, The Development of InternationalRules Concerning Offenses and
Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, 1 CAN. YRBK. INT'L L. 230 (1963);
Horlick, The Developing Law of Aircraft Hijacking, 12 HARv. INT'L L.J. 33 (1971).
129. Article 11 states:
1. When a person on board has unlawfully committed by force or threat
thereof an act of interference, seizure, or other wrongful exercise of control of
an aircraft in flight or when such an act is about to be committed, Contracting
States shall take all appropriate measures to restore control of the aircraft to
its lawful commander or to preserve his control of the aircraft.
2. In the cases contemplated in the preceding paragraph, the Contracting
State in which the aircraft lands shall permit its passengers and crew to continue their journey as soon as practicable, and shall return the aircraft and its
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punishment or extradition, the determination of criminality
was left solely to the host state. As a result, aircraft hijackings
did not decrease, and further measures were needed."'
The Hague Convention
The Hague Convention for Suppression of the Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft was adopted in December of 1970.131 This treaty
defined aircraft hijacking as an offense, 32 and required each
'
contracting state to provide for "severe penalties." 3
The Hague Convention requires that the offender either be
extradited or prosecuted by the host country. 1 4 The words
"without exception whatsoever" exclude any discretion by the
host country in deciding whether the case should be referred to
prosecuting authorities. Although it is unclear whether the
non-discretionary obligation to prosecute implies a concurrent
obligation to disregard the offender's political motivation, the
United States interprets this provision as forbidding any in1 35
quiry into the motivation of the offender.
cargo to the persons lawfully entitled to possession.
The Tokyo Convention did not provide any specific punishment for hijackers, but
stressed the principle of cooperation between the contracting states for the purpose of
restoring control to the commander and allowing the flight to continue to its destination.
130. See Hearingson Resolutions ConcerningAircraftHijacking and Related Matters Before the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 91st Cong., 2nd Sess., 6 (1970);
Mendelsohn, In-flight Crime: The Internationaland Domestic Picture under the
Tokyo Convention, 53 VA. L. REv. 509, 513 (1967).
131. December 16, 1970, 22 U.S.T. 1641, T.I.A.S. No. 7192 (effective October 14,
1971) [hereinafter cited as the Hague Convention]. For a list of the 76 states that have
ratified the Convention see 1976 UNITED STATES TREATIEs IN FORCE 332.
132. Article 1 of the Convention states that:
Any person who on board an aircraft in flight:
(a) unlawfully, by force or threat thereof, or by any other form of intimidation,
seizes, or exercises control of, that aircraft, or attempts to perform any such act,
or
(b) is an accomplice of a person who performs or attempts to perform any such
act
commits an offence ...
133. Id. art. 2.
134. Article 7 provides as follows:
The Contracting State in the territory of which the alleged offender is found
shall, if it does not extradite him, be obliged, without exception whatsoever and
whether or not the offence was committed in its territory, to submit the case to
its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution. Those authorities shall
take their decision in the same manner as in the case of any ordinary offence of
a serious nature under the law of that State.
135. ICAO Doc. 8979-LC/165-I at 9; 60 DEP'T STATE BULL. 212, 213 (1969).
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Article 8 of the Hague Convention contains the general extradition scheme, and, as such, represents a carefully worded
compromise between the parties to the Convention. 36 The provisions of the article automatically include aircraft hijacking as
a scheduled offense in existing extradition treaties between
contracting states. 3 '
There is nothing in the Convention, however, which prevents the host country from declaring that the hijacker is a
political offender and not subject to the extradition process.
Furthermore, the host nation may lawfully refuse extradition,
if municipal authorities will prosecute the hijacker in accord
with Article 7's mandate.
The article further provides that if a nation requires an
existing treaty with another nation to honor a request of extradition, it may honor such a request on the basis of the terms
of the Hague Convention.'3 In this respect, the Convention can
be regarded as an "optimal" multilateral extradition treaty for
those nations which require an extradition treaty, but for some
reason, have not concluded one with the other nation in interest.
Unfortunately, the Convention poses a multi-jurisdictional
problem for the host state in that several states may move to
extradite the offender under the provisions of Articles 8(4) and
4(1).11 Since the Convention is silent as to priority in extradi136. Abramovsky, Multilateral Conventions for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure and Interference with Aircraft - Part I: The Hague Convention, 13 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 381, 402 (1974). The United States, Soviet Union and its Eastern European allies were the chief proponents of a mandatory extradition scheme. In contrast,
the Western European and Arab nations opposed any mandatory scheme. The considerations of the various blocs were entirely different, but generally depended on the
previous activity of hijackers in a particular country and the traditional political
concerns of the communist block nations.
137. Article 8 (1) provides that:
The offence shall be deemed to be included as an extraditable offence in any
extradition treaty existing between Contracting States. Contracting States undertake to include the offence as an extraditable offence in every extradition
treaty to be concluded between them.
138. Article 8 (2) states:
If a Contracting State which makes extradition conditional on the existence
of a treaty receives a request for extradition from another Contracting State with
which it has no extradition treaty, it may at its option consider this Convention
as the legal basis for extradition in respect of the offence. Extradition shall be
subject to the other conditions provided by the law of the requested state.
139. The pertinent sections are as follows:
Article 8(4). The offence shall be treated, for the purpose of extradition
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tion, the host country can select the recipient country from the
several who apply for the hijacker's return. The grounds for
such a choice could run the gamut from political to humanitarian-depending upon each requesting nation's laws and probable penalties.
In conclusion, the Hague Convention does present a necessary and worthwhile step towards uniformity in international
hijacking laws. However, it does not require the extradition of
a hijacker to another nation. Instead, it allows an election by
the host country either to extradite or to refer the case to proper
authorities for prosecution. Therefore, the political offense exemption remains a viable defense to extradition under the
Hague Convention. Moreover, a practical examination of the
world political atmosphere would suggest that a mandatory
extradition scheme would result in only a small number of
states ratifying the Convention.' It is undoubtedly wiser to
narrow the gap gradually in the nations' treatment of politically motivated hijackers, rather than risk the permanent establishment of several havens for hijackers. Mandatory extradition could thus hinder the creation of a "common law of
extradition," and erect obstacles to the ultimate goal of a uniform international practice.' 4 '
between Contracting States, as if it had been committed not only in the place
in which it occurred, but also in the territories of the states required to establish
their jurisdiction in accordance with Article 4, paragraph 1.
Article 4(1). Each Contracting State shall take such measures as may be
necessary to establish its jurisdiction over the offence and any other act of
violence against passengers or crew committed by the alleged offender in
connection with the offence, in the following cases:
(a) When the offence is committed on board an aircraft registered in
that state;
(b) When the aircraft on board which the offence is committed lands
in its territory with the alleged offender still on board;
(c) When the offence is committed on board an aircraft leased without
crew to a lessee who has his principal place of business, or, if the lessee
has no such place of business, his permanent residence, in that state.
140. Abramovsky, supra note 136, at 404-05.
141. The Montreal Convention for Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the
Safety of Civil Aviation, September 23, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 564, T.I.A.S. No.7570 (effective
January 26, 1973) has been ratified by both Great Britain and the United States. The
Montreal Convention has an extradition scheme identical to the Hague Convention,
but includes a list of offenses which are defined to be acts which unlawfully interfere
with the safety of civil aviation. Such acts include those which damage or destroy the
aircraft, the communication of false information endangering safety, and generally,
any act of violence against a person on board an aircraft that is likely to endanger its
safety. See Abramovsky, Multilateral Conventions for the Suppression of Unlawful
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Problems Under the Refugee Convention
The United States and Great Britain are signatories to the
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees.4 2 This Refugee
Protocol was taken from the older Refugee Convention, which
contained the following provisions on the return of refugees to
nations where they would be prosecuted:
Prohibition of Expulsion or Return
1. No Contracting State shall expel or return ("refouler") a
refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account
of his . . . political opinion.
2. The benefit of the present provision may not, however, be
claimed by a refugee whom there are reasonable grounds for
regarding as a danger to the security of the country in which
he is, or who, having been convicted by a final judgment of a
particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger to the com43
munity of that country.
The obligation clearly undertaken by the United States and
Great Britain under the above article is not to return (or extradite) one who would be regarded as a political offender. A conflict arises when the duty not to extradite a political offender
under the Refugee Convention is contrasted against the obligation to extradite or refer for prosecution all aircraft hijackers
under the Hague Convention.'
The ultimate determination of the conflict will depend, in
large measure, on Article 1(F) of the Refugee Convention. That
article states that a refugee may not be an actor who: (a) commits a crime against peace or humanity, (b) commits an act
contrary to the principles and purposes of the United Nations,
or (c) commits a nonpolitical crime outside the state of asylum.
By definition, it seems clear that aircraft hijacking should not
be considered a crime against peace or humanity, 4 ' or a crime
Seizure and Interference with Aircraft - PartII: The Montreal Convention, 14 COLUM.
J. TRANSNAT'L L. 268, 296 (1975).
142. 19 U.S.T. 6225, T.I.A.S. No. 6577 [hereinafter cited as the Refugee Protocol].
The Refugee Protocol was taken to the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees,
189 U.N.T.S. 150 [hereinafter cited as the Refugee Convention]. The United States,
Great Britain and Ireland are all parties to the Refugee Convention.
143. Refugee Convention, art. 33, para. 1.
144. Bassiouni, supra note 9, at 228.
145. Comment, Skyjacking and Refugees: The Effect of the Hague Convention
Upon Asylum, 16 HARv. INT'L L.J. 93, 103 (1975).
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against the purposes and principles of the United Nations. 4 '
However, it is probable that the hijacker committed a nonpolitical crime outside the state of asylum, and hence, could not be
classified as a refugee.' 47 Undoubtedly, a hijacker would violate
several laws of civil aviation in the nation in which he hijacked
the aircraft. If the controlling factor is the commission of a
nonpolitical crime, it seems that only those hijackers who appropriated the aircraft for the sole purpose of escaping political
persecution would qualify as "refugees" under the Convention.'
A problem which further clouds the obligations of the
United States and Great Britain is the provision of the Hague
Convention which requires that all contracting states use the
same considerations in making their decision to prosecute as
are employed with regard to any ordinary offense of a serious
nature.' The provision clearly does not attempt to recommend
light sentences for hijackers and, indeed, the drafting history
of that particular section leads one to believe that the United
States' interpretation of the article mandates "severe" punishment for hijackers. 5 ' Thus, it is apparent that treaty obligations requiring "severe" penalties for hijackers, when compared with other treaty provisions requiring that refugees or
political offenders be granted asylum, present at least prima
facie, conflicting goals for the United States and Great Britain.
Both Great Britain's vast reservoir of judicial decisions and
her traditional posture of sympathy regarding political offenders will aid in the resolution of the conflicting duties under the
Hague and Refugee Conventions. Recourse will undoubtedly be
made to the Kolczynski'5' decision, and the obligations under
146. Id.
147. Refugee Convention, art. 1, para. F(b).
148. The International Law Association passed a resolution which supported the
proposition that the hijacker should be granted asylum from political persecution by
the host state, but should be tried and punished for offenses committed against air
traffic regulations. INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION, 55TH CONFERENCE, New York, at
34 (1972).
149. Bassiouni, supra note 9, at 228.
150. Comment, Skyjacking and Refugees: The Effect of Hague Convention Upon
Asylum, 16 HARv. INT'L L.J. at 106-07 n. 94. The United States air piracy statute
provides for a minimum sentence of twenty years imprisonment for the commission or
attempted commission of aircraft hijacking, and a mandatory life imprisonment or
death sentence if a death results from the commission or attempt, 49 U.S.C.A. §
1472(i)(n) (1974). See Comment, 16 So. TEx. L.J. 356 (1975).
151. See note 52 supra and accompanying text.
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the Refugee Convention will predominate. Kolczynski will control all situations where the hijacking was committed in order
to escape the political persecution of a totalitarian government.
Asylum will surely be granted in such cases, with only the
barest minimum (if any) punishment imposed. 5 2
On the other hand, the United States will most certainly
have a difficult time reconciling its conflicting obligations. The
American judiciary has only paid lip-service to the principles
set forth in Kolczynski. 53 The posture of various American delegates at conferences considering aircraft hijacking leads one to
believe that political motivation will not be considered as a
mitigating factor. It is unreasonable to believe that the United
States will not extradite or severely punish a politically motivated hijacker because of the Refugee Convention's provisions.
Since the American judiciary has not adopted the rule of
Kolczynski in cases of ordinary political offenses, it is unlikely
that a surge of humanitarianism will extend that principle to
aircraft hijacking-an offense considered to be most serious by
the often-victimized government of the United States.
The Diplomatic Convention
In response to the growing number of terrorist attacks
against diplomats, the United Nations General Assembly
adopted the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
Crimes against Diplomatic Agents and Other Internationally
Protected Persons. 5 ' The Diplomatic Convention sought to
deter terrorist acts against diplomats by defining "internationally protected persons"' 55 and specifying certain crimes which
would be subject to severe punishment or extradition.'
The draft articles to the Diplomatic Convention provided
152. See In re Kavic, Bjelanovic and Arsenijevic (1952) Ann. Dig. 371 (No. 80)
(Fed. Trib., Switzerland). The case concerned an aircraft hijacking from a totalitarian
nation, and expressed the principle that the necessity of preserving the political freedom and lives of the hijackers was sufficient to excuse the non-serious injuries committed against the crew and aircraft. This case is consistent with the reasoning in
Kolczynski.
153. In re Gonzalez, 217 F. Supp. 717, 721 (S.D. N.Y. 1963).
154. Opened for signature December 14, 1973, G.A. Res. 3166, U.N. Doc.
A/Res/3166 (XXVIII) (1974). Ireland, Great Britain and the United States are signatories to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, April 18, 1961, 500 U.N.T.S.
95 (effective December 13, 1972). The text can be found at 55 Am. J. INT'L L. 1064
(1961) [hereinafter referred to as Diplomatic Convention].
155. Diplomatic Convention, art. 1.
156. Id. art. 2.
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that the listed acts were to be considered crimes "regardless of
[the] motive" of the accused.' 51 Unfortunately, this language
was deleted in the Convention's final draft. The deletion of this
phrase eroded one of the main thrusts of the Convention,
namely, to effectively prohibit the defense of political motivation by the criminal. The host state's municipal law will now
control the determination of a possible political offense.
The section of the Diplomatic Convention which mandates
that an accused must be extradited or referred to the proper
authorities for prosecution is patterned after its counterpart
provisions in the Hague and Montreal Conventions.' 8 The provisions of the Convention which require referral of the case to
the proper authorities do not create any obligation to punish
the accused or even to conduct a trial. The state's obligation
is satisfied when it has submitted the case to the proper authorities. The decision of the authorities is limited only by the
requirement that it be made in good faith.' 9
The extradition scheme of the Diplomatic Convention contains the same provisions as the Hague and Montreal Conventions. The slight semantic differences appearing in the Diplomatic Convention merely reflect the fact that the crimes listed
in the Diplomatic Convention have been commonly regarded
as criminal offenses by all nations. On the other hand, aircraft
hijacking and related offenses have not customarily been included in bilateral extradition treaties.'10
The most interesting aspect of the Convention was the inclusion of an article which recognized the right of asylum between countries which have concluded a prior treaty on the
subject:
157. The International Law Commission's report provided as follows: "[T]he expression 'regardless of motive' restates the universally accepted legal principle that it
is [the] intent to commit the act, and not the reason that led to its commission that
is the governing factor." Int'l L. Comm'n, Report 27 U.N. G.A.O.R., Supp. 10, U.N.
Doc. A/8710/Rev. 1 (1972). Reprinted in Kearney, Report on the Protectionand Inviolability of Diplomatic Agents (1972) 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 316, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/SER.A/1972/Add.1 (1972).
158. Article 7 of the Diplomatic Convention is very similar to Article 7 of the Hague
Convention, which is identical to Article 7 of the Montreal Convention. The slight
semantic changes are considered to be of no practical effect.
159. Int'l L. Comm'n. Report, 27 U.N. G.A.O.R., Supp. 10 at 97, U.N. Doc.
A/8710/Rev. 1 (1972). See also the justifications given for the identical provisions in
the Hague Convention. G. White, The Hague Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, 6 REv. INT'L COMM'N JURISTs 42 (1971).
160. Quentin-Baxter, Agenda Discussion (1972) 1 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 222, U.N.
Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/(1972).
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The provisions of this Convention shall not affect the application of the Treaties on Asylum, in force at the date of the
adoption of this Convention, as between the States which are
parties to those Treaties; but a State Party to this Convention may not invoke those Treaties with respect to another
State Party to this Convention which is not a party to those
Treaties.'6

This provision was included in the Convention to gain approval
from Latin American countries who were parties to many such
treaties.'6 2 However, its application is specifically limited to the
situation where two states have an asylum treaty in force. The
right of asylum may not be invoked against a state not a party
to an asylum treaty. The non-party state may hold the other
3
state to its obligations to extradite or to refer for prosecution.'1
The Diplomatic Convention follows the lead of the Tokyo,
Hague and Montreal Conventions in that it leaves so many
loopholes regarding the recognition of political offenses that it
undermines the very purpose of the Convention. Generally, the
sole duty of the host nation is to either extradite the offender
or refer his case to the proper authorities for prosecution. If the
case is referred to municipal authorities for action, their good
faith determination as to his political offender status is conclusive.
This situation is especially troubling when one considers the
usual motivations for committing criminal acts against diplomats. Usually such crimes are perpetrated because of the polit161. Diplomatic Convention, art. 12.
162. The Bolivian delegation proposed the wording for Article 12. U.N. Doc.
A/C.6/L.943 (1973). He was strongly supported by eleven Latin American delegations
who had previously proposed an alternative approach similar to the final Article 12
adopted. U.N. Doc.A/C.6/L.928 (1973).
163. Statement by United States Ambassador W. Tapley Bennett, Jr., Acting
United States Representative, in Plenary, December 14, 1973. Press release USUN134(73) December 14, 1973:
The article states that this Convention shall not affect the application of
treaties on asylum in force as between Parties to those treaties inter se. That is
to say, even if the alleged offender is present on the territory of one Party to such
a treaty and the State on the territory of which the crime has taken place is also
a Party to such a treaty, If the internationally protected person attacked exercised his functions on behalf of a State not Party to such a treaty or the alleged
offender was a national of a State not Party to such a treaty, the State where
the alleged offender is present may not invoke that treaty with respect to the
non-Party State. Thus, the non-Party State can hold the State where the alleged
offender is present or its obligations under Article 7 and may, if it wishes,
request extradition under Article 8.
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ical persuasion which the diplomat represents in the eyes of the
terrorist or political offender. This Convention is a necessary
first step, but actually accomplishes nothing in those nations
which maintain the position that political offenses can be committed even in the most brutal of circumstances.' 4
A meaningful second step can be the recognition that any
acts of violence committed on "internationally protected persons" may not be regarded as political offenses. Whether it is
justified under a doctrine of proportionality or through recourse
to basic humanitarian values, the principle is both logical and
necessary. Indeed, a "protected" person should not be stripped
of his basic human right of life because of the political
motivation or intent of his assailant. In no case should political
murder or torture be excused on the basis that its commission
was politically motivated.'65
IV. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS: GREAT BRITAIN AND IRELAND
The Law Enforcement Commissionand ReciprocalLegislation
In May, 1974 the Report of the Law Enforcement Commission'66 was presented to Parliament by the Secretary of State
for Northern Ireland. The Commission's main objective was to
determine the most effective method of bringing fugitive political offenders to trial. The task of the Commission was difficult
since two separate legal systems were involved, and because
the necessary compromise would be acceptable only if limited
to those areas directly affected by the problem. Therefore, it
was decided that only fugitive political offenders and a limited
range of specified offenses would be the subject of proposals in
the Report.'67
Four different procedures were considered by the Commission in its attempt to formulate a solution to the problem: (1)
the all-Ireland court method, (2) the extradition method, (3)
the extraterritorial method, and (4) the mixed courts method.
164. See the discussion of the doctrine of proportionality at note 10 supra.
165. The inclusion of the Belgian or attentatclause would satisfactorily accomplish
this purpose by excluding the offenses of murder and attempted murder of a head of
government or similar persons from being classified as political offenses. See Harvard
Research, supra note 2 at 114; OPPENHEIM, supra note 16, at 709; M. BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 409-10 (1974); M. GARCIA-MORA, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ASYLUM AS A HUMAN RIGHT 82-86 (1956).
166. Law Enforcement Commission, Cmnd. No. 5627 (1974) [hereinafter referred
to as "Report"].
167. Id. at 1.

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 60:777

The all-Ireland court method contemplated the creation of a
uniform code of substantive law and procedure, and the establishment of a new and separate court to deal with political
fugitives and political criminals. The court would have jurisdiction over the entire island and all political crimes committed thereon. The Commission considered the all-Ireland court
proposal to be attractive because of the uniformity it would
bring to the problem. However, the idea of calling a referendum
to set up an amendment to the Constitution of Ireland was
thought to be too time-consuming for the problem at hand.
Hence, the Commission did not urge its adoption." 8
The extradition method was heavily debated in the report
with the British delegates favoring this method, and the Irish
delegates opposing it.' Because of their adamant position on
the issue, the Irish delegates would not recommend extradition
under any circumstances. As a result, the Commission could
make no recommendation as to the merits of the proposal. 70
The extraterritorial method consisted of each legislature
conferring jurisdiction upon its domestic courts to try certain
offenses which were committed in the other part of Ireland. 7'
The underlying principle of such legislation was that an offense
committed in one part of Ireland would also be considered an
offense in the other part. The Commission further included a
provision that a fugitive had the right to choose to be returned
to the part of Ireland where his offense had been committed.
The most important factor considered in discussing the extraterritorial method was the feasibility of securing witnesses.
It was agreed that compelling a witness to cross the border and
give evidence was unacceptable. The more practical system of
empowering the court to request that a witness give evidence
''on a commission in the presence of the members of the court
by a High Court judge of the jurisdiction of the place where the
offense was committed," was adopted.'72 The trial court would
retain the right to decide whether evidence should be taken on
commission, and if so, whether it should be admissible upon
trial. The accused would retain the right to be present at the
168. Id. at 3.
169. Id. at 14-40. See also McCall-Smith & Magee supra note 5, at 211 where the
Irish reluctance was described as being a more fundamental political objection.
170. Report, supra note 166, at 41.
171. Id. at 7.
172. Id. at 8.
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taking of such evidence on commission, and would be immune
from arrest or charge in that jurisdiction while exercising his
attendance right.
The Commission felt that the extraterritorial method could
be introduced quickly and solve the pressing problem. The
efficiency of such a method would be further increased if both
parties undertook to create reciprocal legislation and administrative regulations designed to encourage potential witnesses to
3
attend trial in the other part of Ireland.1

A variation of the extraterritorial method was the mixed
courts proposal. The main difference was that one or two judges
from the jurisdiction of the offense would sit as members of the
trial court in the other jurisdiction.1 74 The proposal had the
dual benefits of boosting public confidence in the mixed courts
system, and of creating an appropriate body to try violent
offenses which are, in effect, committed against the entire island. However, the Commission rejected this proposal because
of problems of efficiency, potential controversy, conflicts in the
oaths of judges, and a general ignorance of the other jurisdiction's law and procedure. Initially, the proposal was rejected as
having no legal or procedural advantage over the existing domestic courts.

75

The Commission finally concluded that the extraterritorial
method contained no legal objections, and the delegates who
had initially favored the extradition method endorsed the extraterritorial method as the next best choice. Since the Irish
delegates favored this method, a consensus was reached that it
be adopted.
The scheduled offenses

71

listed in the report include the

crimes of murder, manslaughter, kidnapping, false imprisonment and hijacking aircraft or other vehicles. Also listed are (1)
causing or attempting to cause an explosion; (2) malicious
damages to property; (3) possessing a firearm with criminal
intent or under suspicious circumstances; 177 (4) robbery or aggravated burglary; (5) escape and prison rescue; (6) inciting,
aiding, or conspiring to commit a scheduled offense; and (7)
173. Id. at 10.
174. Id. at 11.
175. Id. at 13.
176. Id. at 42.
177. See McCall-Smith & Magee, supra note 2, at 210, for a discussion on the
firearms offense.
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knowingly harboring a fugitive or impeding an arrest or prosecution of such a fugitive.
Both countries have undertaken to implement the recommendations of the Report. The Criminal Jurisdiction Act of
1975'1 8 received royal assent on August 7, 1975, and sections 12,
13, part of 14, and schedules 5 and 6 came into force at that
time. The remaining provisions will come into force at other
scheduled times. The Act created extraterritorial offenses, and
gave Northern Ireland courts jurisdiction to try fugitive offenders accused of violent crimes in the Republic of Ireland. 79 Reciprocal legislation was approved in the Republic of Ireland
with the Senate approving a bill that gave Irish courts extraterritorial jurisdiction to try political fugitives for crimes commits°
ted in Northern Ireland or Great Britain.
While the main provisions of the Criminal Jurisdiction Act
of 1975 are restricted to Northern Ireland, section 4(4), combined with schedule 3, establishes immunity in regard to double jeopardy for extraterritorial offenses. The Backing of Warrants (Republic of Ireland) Act 1965,181 section 2(2), was
amended to hold that a warrant from the Republic will not be
executed in the United Kingdom if it is for an extraterritorial
offense under the laws of Ireland, or if the fugitive has been
previously convicted or acquitted of an extraterritorial offense
arising out of the same act.
Section seven of the Criminal Jurisdiction Act of 1975
amends sections two and three of the Explosive Substances Act
of 1883 by making it an offense to cause an explosion likely to
endanger life or property in the Republic of Ireland. Along with
the amended provision relating to attempts and conspiracies to
cause explosions, liability attaching to the former amended
provision applies only to citizens of the United Kingdom and
Colonies.
V.

UNITED STATES

Bilateral Treaties
The United States has traditionally conducted its international extradition procedures solely pursuant to treaty obliga178. Stat. Inst. 1975, No. 1347.
179. 1975 Halsbury's Abr. paras. 672, 2407.
180. THE. TIMES (London), November 4, 1975 at 1.
181. Supra note 70.
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tions since its courts have not recognized asylum and extradition as a part of customary international law. 8 ' The process of
extradition is regarded as a function of domestic law exclusively. Because of its unwillingness to employ international law
to interpret or to supplement ambiguous treaty provisions, the
United States has developed a highly organized system of bilateral treaties pertaining to extradition. 18 3
The British extradition problem has centered around the
problems in the Republic of Ireland. The United States, on the
other hand, has not been confronted with extradition problems
arising in connection with any particular nation. Thus, the
United States has been forced to resort to the process of renegotiating each of its bilateral extradition treaties, while Britain has been able to deal with the problem through reciprocal
legislation.
Although the term "political offense" is still retained in the
new extradition treaties, it remains undefined. Instead of relying on such a definition, a series of exclusions have been created which comprise the category of offenses which shall be
considered extraditable. The treaties entered into since 1970
have included and stressed the two additional offenses of drug
crimes and aircraft hijacking.8 4 These two offenses have been
added to the lists which customarily include murder, kidnapping, extortion, procuration, counterfeiting, fraud, piracy, slavery and arson. The new treaties now include more than thirty
separate serious offenses which are extraditable.
Recent negotiations have added narcotic crimes, bankruptcy, mail fraud and aircraft hijacking to the treaty with
France;' piracy and mutiny or revolt on an aircraft or vessel
to the treaty with New Zealand;186 assault upon a public official

182. Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276, 287 (1933); United States v. Ranscher,
119 U.S. 407, 411-12 (1886). See generally 6 M. WHiTEmAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL

732 (1968).
183. M. BASSIOUNI,

LAW

INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 26 (1974).

184. Letter from President Gerald R. Ford to the Senate of the United States
(February 3, 1976) found in Extradition Treaty with the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland, June 8, 1972, Exec. Doc. 94-A-2. See also Comment, 16
So. Tex. L.J. 356 (1975) for a review and summary of the Antihijacking Act of 1974.
185. Treaty on Extradition United States-France, February 12, 1970, 22 U.S.T.
407, 409, T.I.A.S. No. 7075 (effective April 3, 1971).
186. Treaty on Extradition United States-New Zealand, January 12, 1970, 22
U.S.T. 1, 3, T.I.A.S. No. 7035 (effective December 8, 1970).
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and aircraft hijacking to the treaty with Paraguay;1'8 and aircraft hijacking to the Spanish treaty.' 8 In cases of international
variations in the substantive elements of listed criminal offenses, definitions are set out in the treaties to avoid confusion.' 9
The problem of defining a "political offense" continues to
haunt the treaty-making process. The new treaties continue to
exempt the political offender without clarifying the definition.
A comparison between some of the treaties recently renegotiated and those that have been in existence for some length of
time reveals no major semantic changes. An excellent example
of the language currently employed in the treaties is shown in
the Canadian Treaty on Extradition:
When the offense in respect of which extradition is requested
is of a political character, or the person whose extradition is
requested proves that the extradition request has been made
for the purpose of trying or punishing him for an offense of
the above-mentioned character [extradition shall not be
granted]. If any question arises as to whether a case comes
within the provisions of this subparagraph, the authorities of
the Government on which the requisition is made shall decide.' 0
The Canadian treaty also continues the practice of permitting the host country to decide whether the offense shall be
considered a political crime. This practice has been consistently included in all of the United States' recent extradition
treaties. 9 '
In summary, the United States' action in this area has centered around the renegotiation of several bilateral treaties of
187. Treaty on Extradition United States-Paraguay, May 24, 1973, 25 U.S.T. 967,
971, T.I.A.S. No. 7838 (effective May 7, 1974).
188. Treaty on Extradition United States-Spain, May 29, 1970, 22 U.S.T. 737, 739,
T.I.A.S. No. 7136 (effective June 16, 1971).
189. Treaty on Extradition United States-Italy, January 18, 1973, art. II, para. 30,
T.I.A.S. No. 8052 (effective March 11, 1975), states: "Extradition shall also be granted
for the Italian offense of associazione per delinquere if the request establishes the
elements of a conspiracy, as defined by the laws of the United States ......
190. 121 CONG. REc. 20510 (daily ed. Nov. 20, 1975). The reprint of the new extradition treaty with Australia appears id. at 820499 and contains the identical provisions.
Similar provisions are also included in Treaty on Extradition United States-Denmark,
June 22, 1972, 25 U.S.T. 1293, T.I.A.S. No. 7864 (effective July 31, 1974) and the
extradition treaties with Great Britain and Northern Ireland supra notes 184 and 189
respectively.
191. Evans, Reflections Upon the Political Offenses in International Practice, 57
AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 17 (1963); Evans, The New ExtraditionTreaties of the United States,
59 A. J. INr'L L. 351, 360 (1965).
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extradition. The only change regarding the political offense
exemption is the inclusion of a few major crimes in the list
which sets forth the extraditable offenses. In most cases, the
political offense exemption can apply even to the newly listed
crimes. These crimes generally fit into the scheme of "relative"
political offenses, and the fugitive's burden of proof is to satisfy
12
the requirements of such offenses.
CONCLUSION

A review of three nations' judicial approaches to the issues
involved in extraditing international offenders reveals that
fundamental distinctions exist in the reasoning and purposes
of the respective courts. These distinctions do not merely indicate different historical values and precepts, but also reflect
different attitudes toward the struggles for political freedom
around the world.
Great Britain and the Republic of Ireland have arrived at
their respective postures on international extradition through
entirely different routes. The British courts have systematically resorted to methodical reexamination of the original
Castioniprinciples in an effort to recognize the changing faces
of political oppression. This technique has been complemented
by the regional treaties with the commonwealth states and the
Republic of Ireland to provide an updated and realistic extradition system.
The Republic of Ireland has opted for the extradition
scheme set forth in the European Convention on Extradition.
This allows the courts of Ireland to employ the current judicial
decisions of her ratifying sister nations, in addition to the utilization of her domestic interpretations of "political offenses."
This approach permits the courts to consider and adapt to the
changing political conditions on the European Continent.
The United States continues to suffer from the proliferation
of bilateral extradition treaties which utilize the strict Castioni
test announced eighty-five years ago. It is submitted that the
Castionitest requires that an individual commit a meaningless
(and often suicidal) act of uprising in a totalitarian state in
order to qualify as a political offense. Such a requirement has
little relevance to the true intent of the political offender in a
192. See note 15 and accompanying text supra.
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totalitarian society. The United States' courts must seriously
reexamine its position in such cases. If that reexamination occurs, there is little doubt that the dicta in the Gonzalez case
will be adopted. The extension of the definition of "political
offense" will provide the flexibility needed to treat such offences according to the realities of the twentieth century.
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